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THE SERVICEMAN'S RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH:
AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH
If men are to be precluded from offering their sentiments on
a matter, which may involve the most serious and alarming con-
sequences that can invite the consideration of mankind, reason is
of no use to us; the freedom of speech may be taken away, and
dumb and silent we may be led, like sheep to the slaughter.
-From an address by George Washington to the offi-
cers of the Army, March 15, 1783
I. INTRODUCTION
The past several years have seen a dramatic increase in the
number of reported military free speech cases. The controver-
siality of the Vietnam War seems to be one basic reason; most of
the recent cases involve to some degree the serviceman's dis-
satisfaction with our involvement in Vietnam.' Social unrest of
minorities is a second factor seen in many of the cases.2 What-
ever the underlying reasons, both military and federal courts have
rather suddenly been confronted with a large number of cases in-
volving servicemen who dissent. Unfortunately, too many of
these cases have been decided with a mechanistic application of a
1. See, e.g., United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429
(1967).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131
(1970).
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legal formula rather than by sound analysis. 3 The purpose of
this article is to explore the history of military free speech cases
with the hope of developing analytical guidelines for the future.
Although the ultimate objective of this article is to develop an
approach applicable to the military, civilian free speech cases will
be explored and their principles examined for possible applica-
tion to the military speech cases. Then the military cases will be
examined in their historical context. Finally, using principles ex-
tracted from cases of both types, an approach to the military
cases will be suggested.
II. CvnmiAN FRE SPEECH CASES
Although the subject of this note is military free speech, a pre-
liminary discussion of landmark civilian speech cases is important
for several reasons. Civilian speech concepts have been develop-
ing for more than fifty years, while the military First Amend-
ment cases have a far shorter history.4 The civilian cases are thus
useful because of their relatively long tradition. Additionally,
there is a growing tendency for the courts considering military
cases to adopt civilian speech concepts.5 Because of this, an ex-
amination of the civilian cases can aid in formulating new con-
cepts for use within the military speech context.
The first major Supreme Court case dealing with free speech
was Schenck v. Uniteci States,6 involving a prosecution under
the Espionage Act of 1917. Appellant had been convicted of dis-
tributing pamphlets which urged opposition to the draft. Justice
Holmes delivered the opinion affirming the conviction, stating that
the right of free speech was dependent upon the circumstances
3. No matter how rapidly we utter the phrase "clear and present
danger," or how closely we hyphenate the words, they are not a
substitute for the weighing of values. They tend to convey a
delusion of certitude when what is most certain is the complexity
of the strands in the web of freedoms which the judge must dis-
entangle.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 542-43 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
4. The Supreme Court has been deciding First Amendment cases since
1919. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Since the Bill of
Rights was not held applicable to servicemen until 1960, the military First
Amendment cases are subsequent to that date. See United States v. Ja-
coby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
5. A version of the clear and present danger test, for example, is now
frequently used in the military speech cases. See, e.g., Dash v. Com-
manding General, Fort Jackson South Carolina, 307 F. Supp. 849 (D.S.C.
1969), affd mem., 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981
(1971) [Hereinafter cited as Dash].
6. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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surrounding its exercise.7 In addition, Holmes used the now-fa-
mous clear and present danger phrase for the first time:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.8
Schenck illustrates two themes which are seen throughout the
civilian free speech cases. One principle is that the right of free
speech is not absolute, but is dependent upon the circumstances
surrounding its exercise. This rule has never been seriously ques-
tioned, and is often applied today in the military speech cases.0
The second principle, that of clear and present danger, has had
a somewhat more confused history. It is interesting to note that
Justice Holmes, the author of the test, failed to invoke it in a
similar case decided only one week after Schenck.'0 One might
surmise that Holmes never intended clear and present danger to
become the pivotal phrase in later speech cases. Indeed, it has
been suggested that Holmes tossed off the remark in the Schenck
case, and later used it to dissent from similar judgments.1
After its initial invocation, the clear and present danger test was
next used in Holmes' dissenting opinions. In a 1919 case, for ex-
ample, Holmes declared that the clear and present danger test in-
cluded a requirement that the utterances be protected unless they
posed a threat so imminent that an immediate check was needed
to save the country.12  This requirement of imminency was often
seen in the Holmes opinions of the 1920's, but was not expressly
adopted by the Supreme Court until recently.13
Holmes' insistence on an imminency requirement led to a sharp
division in the ranks of the Court during the 1920's. The two ap-
proaches are clearly seen in the 1925 case of Gitlow v. New York,'4
7. Id. at 52.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Dash, supra note 5.
10. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
11. See Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger", 27 NOTRE
DAmE LAWYER 325, 356 (1952). See also the dissenting opinion of Justice
Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
12. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
13. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
14. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
involving the distribution of allegedly subversive literature. The
majority approach was to first look to the statute in question to
determine its constitutional validity. If the statute was valid, the
words were then examined to determine if they came within the
statute. If so, the words were, almost a fortiori, punishable. The
Holmes approach, on the other hand, included the above analy-
sis but went one step further. Assuming that the statute was con-
stitutional and that the words came within the terms of the stat-
ute, there still had to be present an imminent threat of a substan-
tive evil. Moreover, the imminency test was to be applied on an
ad hoc basis; that is, the words were examined for their forseeable
actual effect in the existing circumstances.15
By 1950, the Court had still not completely agreed upon an ana-
lytical approach to the free speech cases. To be sure, there was
by now majority agreement that clear and present danger was a
valid test; the confusion lay in the application of the doctrine. The
1950 case of Dennis v. United States 6 illustrates the various ap-
proaches taken in determining whether a clear and present dan-
ger does in fact exist. The case involved a conviction under the
Smith Act. The appellant was convicted of organizing the Com-
munist Party and of willfully advocating the duty and necessity of
overthrowing the government.17 The conviction was affirmed,
with five justices submitting separate opinions.
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Vinson relied on an
interpretation of the clear and present danger test formulated by
Learned Hand:
In each case courts must ask whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.' 8
The Court found that the existence of a group which could spring
into action when the time was ripe constituted a sufficient danger
to come under Hand's rule.'9
Justice Frankfurter introduced an interesting analytical concept
in his concurring opinion, where he advocated a balancing be-
tween the government's interest in security and the right of free
speech. This balancing was not for use by the judiciary on an ad
hoc basis; Congress, Frankfurter felt, bore the responsibility of
balancing the competing interests and arriving at a determination.
15. Id. at 673.
16. 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
17. Id. at 497.
18. Id. at 510.
19. Id. at 511.
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As a practical matter, Frankfurter's test would result in a rever-
sion to the majority rule seen in Gitlow: great deference would
be given to the legislative determination, and appellant's con-
duct would then be examined to see if it fit within the terms of
the statute. Thus, an ad hoc determination would not be made
by the judiciary. The voice of Congress, unless patently unreason-
able, would have the final say in free speech cases.
Also of interest in Dennis is Justice Douglas' dissenting opin-
ion, where he argued that for the speech to be punishable, some
immediate injury to society must be likely if the speech were al-
lowed. This requirement of imminency could only be met by the
introduction of evidence showing a substantial danger to society.
Although Justice Douglas was alone in urging the Holmes-
Brandeis imminency requirement in Dennis, the requirement was
eventually adopted outright by the Supreme Court. The 1969 case
of Brandenburg v. Ohio20 reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux
Klan member who had spoken at a rally. The Court declared
Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Statute unconstitutional because it
failed to include an imminency requirement in its proscription of
advocacy.2'
Although Brandenburg settled the imminency question, the fate
of the clear and present danger test was unclear. Strangely
enough, the Court failed to even mention the test. Clearly trou-
bled by this fact, Justices Douglas and Black submitted concur-
ring opinions in which they urged the complete abolition of the
troublesome test.2 2
Although the analytical concepts appropriate to civilian free
speech cases are still not unanimously agreed upon, several defi-
nite conclusions can be drawn. First, after fifty years of grappling
with the problem, the Supreme Court now requires something more
than clear and present danger, if indeed that test is now applicable
at all. Second, there is a requirement of imminency.23  For a
conviction to be within constitutional limits, there must be advo-
cacy which is an incitement to imminent lawless action.
20. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
21. Id. at 448-49.
22. Id. at 449-57.
23. But whether this requirement is a part of the clear and present
danger test is still unsettled.
With the foregoing review of civilian cases in mind, let us now
turn to the military cases.
III. THE MmITARY SPEECH CASES
Not too many years ago if one were to have asked a military
officer whether the Bill of Rights applies to the services, he most
probably would have replied with a curt, "Certainly notP'24
Until 1960, the Bill of Rights was considered inapplicable to the
military services. Although many free speech cases arose during
World War I, World War II, and Korea, these were not based upon
First Amendment considerations. 25 As recently as 1951 the Court
of Military Appeals refused to consider the Bill of Rights applicable
to servicemen.26
The view that servicemen were not protected by the Bill of
Rights was finally abandoned in the 1960 case of United States v.
Jacoby.27 The Court of Military Appeals declared that servicemen
were protected by the Bill except where expressly or implicitly
prohibited by the Constitution.28 In a sense, the decision brought
the military cases to a stage of development similar to that faced
by the Supreme Court in its early subversive speech decisions. 29
The question now faced by the military tribunals was how the
First Amendment should be applied in individual cases. As will
be seen, the military tribunals chose not to apply current Supreme
Court doctrines in the early cases. Instead, the courts developed
their own concepts in a manner analogous to the early civilian
case development. That is, the First Amendment was initially ap-
plied quite restrictively, and then gradually liberalized as the num-
ber of cases increased.30 In addition, the later military cases be-
gan to apply civilian constitutional concepts more freely, thus has-
tening the liberalization process.31 To see how the military analy-
sis of these cases has developed, let us now turn to a consideration
of the military speech cases.
24. Lewis, Freedom of Speech-An Examination of the Civilian Test
For Constitutionality and its Application to the Military, 41 Mm. L. REV.
55,76 (1968).
25. See Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President: An Uneasy Look at
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HAv. L. REv. 1697, 1724-32 (1968).
26. United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 1 C.M.R. 74 (1951).
27. 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
28. Id. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47.
29. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
30. Compare United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429
(1967) with United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131
(1970).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131(1970), where the Court applied constitutional principles from an analogous
civilian speech case.
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As has been noted, the First Amendment was not expressly held
applicable to servicemen until 1960. Prior to that time, however,
there had been some discussion of the scope of military speech
rights; it was this discussion which finally led to the Jacoby de-
cision. An interesting example is the 1954 case of United States v.
Voorhees.32 It involved a career army officer convicted of failing
to submit a manuscript to Army censors prior to publication.
While the Court affirmed the conviction by declaring prior re-
straints on publication necessary in the military, there was dic-
tum concerning the scope of servicemen's speech rights. The dic-
tum stated that servicemen should be given the same constitutional
protection as their civilian counterparts, except where specifi-
cally limited or denied by the Constitution.3 3 While this lan-
guage is somewhat broader than that actually adopted in Jacoby,3 4
it illustrates a growing sentiment that the Bill of Rights should
be made applicable to servicemen.
Later cases of the 1950's added some important concepts to the
growing body of military free speech law. For example, the Court
of Military Appeals in one case declared an order invalid because
it was so vague as to restrict appellant's freedom of speech.35 While
the case did not state the legal basis for appellant's right of free
speech, it is interesting to note the military use of the void for
vagueness doctrine, a concept often seen in the civilian free
speech cases.36 In another case, the Court held that a young soldier
could not be prosecuted for communicating a threat when he had
merely exercised his right to transmit grievances to his Senator.37
Again, however, the legal basis for the right of free speech was
not reached by the Court.
By 1960, when Jacoby was decided, there was thus a small body
of military speech law already in existence. Compared with its
civilian counterpart, however, the military law was quite unsophis-
ticated. This can be clearly seen by a comparison with the Su-
32. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1954).
33. Id. at 530-31, 16 C.M.R. at 104-05.
34. Here, the restriction is based upon specific limitations within the
Constitution. In Jacoby, the Court speaks of those rights which are by
necessary implication inapplicable to servicemen.
35. United States v. Wysong, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 26 C.M.R. 29 (1958).
36. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
37. United States v. Schmidt, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 57, 36 C.M.R. 213 (1966).
preme Court case of United States v. Dennis,38 which dealt with
complex questions of application, and used legal concepts which
had undergone thirty years of development. The military cases,
on the other hand, were still cautiously probing for applicable
legal concepts.
The 1967 case of United States v. Howe3 9 illustrates both the
progress made by the military tribunals since 1960, and the remain-
ing problem of application. Lt. Howe had participated in an anti-
war rally while off duty and not in uniform. He was charged
under Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice40 for us-
ing contemptuous words againt the President. In addition, he was
charged under Article 133 of the Code4" for conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman. The Court of Military Appeals af-
firmed the conviction, holding that both Artices were exceptions to
the Bill of Rights, since they both antedated the Constitution.
The Court thus never actually reached the question of First
Amendment application, although the clear and present danger
test was in fact mentioned. 42
An additional ground for upholding Article 88 was the man on a
white horse theory.43 This argument says that the Founding
Fathers wanted to keep the military in check by having civilians
exercise ultimate control over the services. Disrespectful acts by
the military, the theory goes, create the danger of the military hero,
the man on a white horse, attempting a military coup. Thus,
words disrespectful of the President are punishable because of their
potential danger to civilian supremacy in the military services.
Howe raises several intriguing questions. For example, what
would the result have been had the Court seriously attempted to
use some form of clear and present danger or imminency test.
Had this been done, a sustained conviction would be difficult to
imagine. To say that Howe's conduct constituted a clear and pres-
38. 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
39. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
40. Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against
the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of De-
fense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of
the Treasury, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Terri-
tory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or pres-
ent shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 888 (1970).
41. Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is con-
victed of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970).
42. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 172, 37 C.M.R. at 436.
43. Id. at 175, 37 C.M.R. at 439.
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ent danger to military discipline, morale or loyalty, is a conclu-
sion unsupported by the facts. Lt. Howe was off base, off duty,
and in civilian clothes. The likelihood that his conduct would have
a measureable effect on military morale or discipline seems
very slight indeed. If Howe had directly attempted to influence
the men under his command, or had appeared in uniform as a
representative of the armed forces, the danger would certainly
have been greater than in the instant case. In fact, one might
argue that the court-martial of Lt. Howe only served to make mat-
ters worse because of the publicity surrounding his trial.
The man on a white horse argument has been vigorously criti-
cized on the grounds that a military coup is extremely unlikely in
the United States today. Furthermore, it is argued, the real dan-
ger of a man on a white horse comes not from the lower-ranking
officers, but from generals and other military leaders who con-
ceivably could exert great influence on public opinion. Thus, the
utterances of low-ranking officers should be permitted because
their possible effect will be minimal.44
The Howe approach is reminiscent of some of the early Su-
preme Court civilian speech decisions, where the legislation was
first examined to determine its validity, and the utterance was
then examined to see if it came within the terms of the statute.45
Clearly, this was the approach used in Howe, for circumstances
surrounding the utterance were not examined in any great detail.
Unlike the early civilian cases, however, the military court at this
point has no latter-day Justice Holmes to furnish an argument for
some form of imminency test.
Between 1967, when Howe was decided, and 1969, growing
disenchantment with the Vietnam War gave rise to several im-
portant military free speech cases. While the military courts rarely
attempted in-depth analysis of the constitutional factors involved,
there was at least some assimilation of analogous civilian free
speech concepts. With First Amendment rights now clearly appli-
cable to servicemen, the military courts began to gradually adopt
44. See Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amend-
ment Rights, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 325, 344-50 (1970) [Hereinafter cited as
Sherman].
45. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 US. 652 (1925).
the language of the Supreme Court; the clear and present danger
test, for example, was finding its way into the military cases with
increasing frequency.46 Unfortunately, however, the test was of-
ten applied mechanically without a consideration of the surround-
ing circumstances.4 7
The year 1969 also saw the First Amendment question approached
from a somewhat different angle. In United States v. Locks,48 ap-
pellant was convicted of failing to obey a lawful order when he wore
his uniform at an anti-war rally. The Board of Review affirmed
the conviction, holding that the order was valid from a constitu-
tional standpoint. Appellant was sentenced to one year at hard
labor.
Locks is interesting from several aspects. The case involved
symbolic as opposed to pure speech. This form of expression has
been constitutionally less protected than pure speech by the Su-
preme Court.49 Additionally, appellant here was convicted not for
the form of expression actually used, but for disobeying a lawful
order. The situation is somewhat analogous to the case of the
public employee who disobeys an order to disclose past political
affiliations. The Supreme Court has held that dismissal of the em-
ployee who disobeys is justified under some circumstances. 0 The
punishment in the military, however, is typically not mere dismis-
sal; in Locks, for example, the punishment was the equivalent of
a felony conviction. This seems unduly harsh in light of Locks'
offense and its probable effect upon the military. It is submitted
that some type of administrative remedy would have been far
more appropriate. 1
The problem of applying a complex legal principle such as clear
and present danger was finally faced squarely in the 1970 case of
United States v. Daniels.52 The appellant was a black Marine who
had made statements such as, "Viet Nam is a white man's war,"
and, "blacks did not belong over there."53 Daniels had also urged
a group of black troopers to attend a request mast, a method of
46. See, e.g., United States v. Amick, 40 C.M.R. 720 (1969).
47. Id.
48. 40 C.M.R. 1022 (1969).
49. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
50. Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
51. Other writers have suggested various administrative remedies as an
alternative to the felony conviction in military speech cases. See, e.g.,
Sherman, supra note 44, at 340.
52. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970). See also the companion
case of United States v. Harvey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 539, 42 C.M.R. 141 (1970).
53. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 533, 42 C.M.R. at 135.
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airing grievances in the Marine Corps.54 Daniels was charged un-
der the Smith Act for urging insubordination, disloyalty, and re-
fusal of duty.
Surprisingly enough, the Court used a civilian free speech case as
the basis for its analysis.55 VVhile this concept is not new, it dem-
onstrates the increasing importance of civilian concepts in the
military cases. The Court, using this rationale, declared that two
elements in addition to the alleged acts needed proof. First, the
intent of the accused to cause disloyalty had to be shown; this was
the subjective element. Second, there was an objective require-
ment that there be a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil prohibited by statute. 0
As to intent, defense counsel had urged that Daniels' utter-
ances were nothing more than harmless bull sessions. The Court
rejected this contention by finding that Daniels' exhortations were
a subtle method of leading his fellow black Marines into insub-
ordination.57
Turning to the question of clear and present danger, the court
noted the circumstances existing at the time the statements by
Daniels were made. There had been racial unrest in major
cities, many of the black Marines were discontented, and the
blacks were a "particularly susceptible group."58  Taking these
factors into account, the Court concluded that Daniels' activity con-
stituted a clear and present danger to the loyalty of the blacks in
the company.59
Daniels was a step forward in several respects. The clear and
present danger test was found applicable in a military setting, and
the Court made some effort to taking the surrounding circum-
stances into account. However, when compared with Supreme
Court decisions of the same period, Daniels is quite far behind con-
ceptually. The Supreme Court had decided Brandenburg v.
OhioG0 just before Daniels, declaring that there must be an immi-
54. For an excellent discussion of this case, written by one of Daniels'
defense attorneys, see Sherman, supra note 45.
55. Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
56. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 532, 42 C.M.R. at 134.
57. Id. at 535, 42 C.M.R. at 137.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
nent danger to the country before a speech conviction could stand.0'
Had this rationale been used in Daniels, the result might have been
quite different. The actual effect of Daniels' speech was to cause
a handful of men to request mast, an action which of itself was
perfectly legal. Had any of the men actually refused to fight,
they could have been dealt with at the proper time. Taking into
account the vocal nature of Black Muslim rhetoric and the fact
that the case involved only a handful of men, it appears unlikely
that there was an imminent danger of a serious evil.
Thus far, the military free speech cases discussed have been
limited to those decided by military tribunals. Although the mili-
tary cases decided by civilian courts are relatively few in number
because of the hesitancy of federal tribunals to intervene in mili-
tary matters,62 a few district courts have allowed free speech chal-
lenges. Let us now turn to a consideration of these cases.
While it might be anticipated that the federal courts would read-
ily use the civilian free speech concepts in military controver-
sies, this has not been the case. In fact, the courts have been
somewhat disappointing in their failure to attempt a true analyti-
cal approach. This is undoubtedly attributable in part to the tra-
ditional unwillingness of federal courts to interfere with inter-
nal military affairs. While this reluctance is understandable, it is
submitted that the federal courts, once jurisdiction is assumed,
have an obligation to critically analyze the facts and circumstances
of each case.6
The Federal Court approach toward free speech in the military
is well illustrated by the 1969 case of Dash v. Commanding Gen-
eral, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.4 The case involved an action
for declaratory judgment brought by servicemen stationed at Fort
Jackson. They claimed that their constitutional rights were in-
fringed when the commanding officer of the post refused to allow
public debate and distribution of pamphlets concerning the Viet-
nam War.
The Court began its analysis by defining the scope of service-
men's speech rights. The Court declared that these rights were
not absolute, but were limited by the peculiar circumstances of the
military. Also noted was the traditional reluctance of civilian
61. Id. at 447.
62. For an enlightening discussion of this issue, see Mindes v. Seaman,
453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
63. See note 3 supra.
64. See note 5 supra.
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courts to interfere with internal military affairs. Using these
two restrictions, the Court concluded that post commanders did
have authority to limit on-base distribution of handbills and regu-
late meetings, as long as the authority was exercised "reason-
ably." The question of reasonableness, moreover, was one which
the Federal District Courts had jurisdiction to pass on.65
The question of reasonableness was decided by the Court based
on a variation of the clear and present danger test: whether the
conduct in question constituted a clear danger to the loyalty, dis-
cipline, or morale of the troops. 66 Regrettably, the Court did
not attempt a hard analysis of the circumstances surrounding
the utterances, or their foreseeable consequences. Instead, the
Court merely concluded that the proposed conduct would con-
stitute a clear danger; no explanation of this result was at-
tempted.
It will be noted that Dash was decided the same year as Brand-
enburg v. Ohio.67 It is not surprising, then, that the Court in
Dash doesn't speak of an inuninency requirement, since that is-
sue was not clearly decided until Brandenburg. It is disappoint-
ing to note, however, the reluctance of the court in Dash to even
attempt an analytical approach to clear and present danger, par-
ticularly since one might assume that Federal District Courts
would quite freely adopt the techniques found in the civilian cases.
It is submitted that even the confusion left by United States v.
Dennis,68 with its five different approaches to the free speech
problem, would be preferable to the mechanistic application of one
test or another.
The shortcomings seen in Dash have unfortunately not been
remedied by the very recent cases. An example is the 1972 case of
Schneider v. Laird,6 9 involving the refusal of a post commander
to allow publication of an underground newspaper, The Daisy.
The Court affirmed the District Court in refusing to enjoin the post
commander, using the same test found in Dash: whether there
exists a clear danger to troop discipline, loyalty or morale.7O As
65. Id. at 854.
66. See note 5 supra at 855-56.
67. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
68. 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
69. 453 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1972).
70. Id. at 347.
in Dash, an analysis of what constitutes a clear danger was not
attempted.
The cases decided by the federal courts have thus far added
relatively little to the military free speech doctrine developed by
military tribunals. While it may be hoped that the federal courts
will quickly adopt Supreme Court concepts in the future, the out-
look is rather bleak. The reluctance of federal courts to interfere
with internal military matters will probably continue to act as
a restriction in the district court cases. Additionally, the cessa-
tion of hostilities in Viet Nam will undoubtedly remove a major
cause of dissent among servicemen.
IV. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion of military speech cases discloses a
strong trend toward adoption of the analytical principles used in
civilian free speech controversies. Remembering that the First
Amendment has been expressly applicable to servicemen for only
ten years, the progress made has been substantial.
It is now generally conceded that the First Amendment applies
to servicemen. Also unquestioned is the premise that these rights
are not absolute, and that they may be restricted by the pecu-
liar needs and interests of the military service. One method of de-
fining these rights in a particular case is to use some type of bal-
ancing test, a concept impliedly utilized in some of the recent
military cases.7 1 Under this theory, the social interest in free
speech is balanced against the government's interest in security,
discipline, and morale. The extent to which speech will be pro-
tected is determined on an ad hoc basis, using such factors as the
type of speech in question, whether the speech is pure or involves
conduct, the circumstances surrounding the utterance, the nature of
the government's interest, and so on.
It has been noted that the clear and present danger test is now
of questionable validity. 2 Perhaps this test should be abandoned
completely, for there has been a traditionally mechanistic appli-
cation of the rule. Assuming, however, that the test is retained in
some form, certain guidelines should be observed by the courts.
Before a clear danger is deemed to exist, the circumstances sur-
rounding an utterance should be carefully examined. An utter-
ance made in the barracks, for example, might bear different in-
ferences than a statement made on the battlefield.
71. See, e.g., Dash, supra, note 5.
72. See discussion of Brandenburg v. Ohio at 147, supra.
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As we have seen, the requirement that there be imminent dan-
ger of a substantive evil has now been fully accepted by the Su-
preme Court for civilian speech cases.7 3 Unfortunately, however,
this requirement has not as yet been expressly applied to the mili-
tary cases. There seems to be general agreement that the actual
occurrence of a particular evil need not be shown; the examina-
tion of past cases to see what actually happened, however, fur-
nishes insight into what is or is not imminent danger. A case in
point is United States v. Daniels,7 4 where the rhetoric sounded
quite dangerous, but the actual result was that a handful of blacks
requested mast. A court faced with a problem similar to Daniels
might well use that case as an aid in determining imminency.
Putting the above-mentioned principles together to form a co-
herent analysis is concededly difficult; however, some attempt at
analysis is preferable to a mechanical application of the clear and
present danger test. The overall analytical scheme might look
like this: first, the competing interests of the government and
free speech would be weighed. Then, some type of imminency
test would be applied. The tests would be dependent upon each
other; if, for example, the government interest was found to be
extremely high and the free speech interest quite low, the proof
requirement for imminency would be correspondingly low.
The legal system has made significant progress in its approach
to free speech among civilians. While there has been no final reso-
lution of the many complex issues involved, the courts have
gradually moved- away from a mechanical application of one test
or another.
This has unfortunately not been the case in the military speech
cases. While substantial progress has been made in affirming the
serviceman's identity as a citizen as well as a soldier, the courts
have retained the practice of mechanically applying a rule to a
wide variety of facts. Only when this approach is finally aban-
doned will the serviceman who dissents be afforded true justice.
ALFRED J. WALDcHm
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74. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 529, 42 C.M.R. 131 (1970), discussed supra at 152.
